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CASE COMMENT
Comment: Accepting Jurisdiction in Foreign Patent Valid-
ity Suits-Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408 (1972)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Packard Instrument Company v. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., I the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois abstained from exercising jurisdiction to de-
termine the validity of several patents granted by foreign
states. In its complaint, Packard Instrument Company alleged
infringement of a United States patent and of corresponding
patents in nine foreign countries: Canada, France, Israel, Italy,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and West Germany.
Beckman Instruments, as defendant, pleaded to the first count
of infringement in the United States, asserting invalidity as an
affirmative defense and counterclaimed for a declaratory judg-
ment of invalidity. Defendant also moved to dismiss the re-
maining counts of infringement on the ground that the court
was without jurisdiction. In granting the motion and declining
jurisdiction, Judge Tone relied upon three reasons:
(1) a determination of the issue of validity of a foreign patent
would involve a "form of governmental interest;" (2) under the
circumstances, a court of the United States would "not be suita-
ble to enforcement of the foreign based claim;" and (3) resolution
of the U.S. patent claims would adequately solve the problem.'
The decision in Beckman Instruments is based upon an
arbitrary finding by the court. Without a precise rule to guide
the court in exercising jurisdiction, decisions will continue to
waver; therefore, a standard needs to be developed. To this end
the court in Beckman Instruments might better have assumed
jurisdiction over the foreign patents. This article will first ana-
lyze the court's right to assume jurisdiction. Second, some
choice of law problems inherent in an assumption of jurisdic-
tion will be examined. And finally, the effect of the application
of foreign patents will be assessed.
1. 346 F. Supp. 408 (1972).
2. Id. at 409-10.
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I. JURISDICTION
The territorial limitations of sovereignty have been held to
preclude a nation-state from giving extraterritorial effect to its
patent law.' Patents therefore confer rights which are protected
only within the boundaries of the issuing country.' Courts have
also held that a foreign patent grants no rights or protection to
the owner for acts done in the United States.' Regardless of
these well-established notions of the territorial limits of the
patent grant and its enforcement, the question of whether a
United States court may properly adjudicate a claim of the
validity of a foreign patent has not been fully considered.
There is little authority concerning the power of a federal
court to litigate a claim based on a foreign patent. The Consti-
tution and statutory language have given jurisdiction to federal
courts over causes of action arising under the patent laws of the
United States.' Yet that language does not purport to cover
claims arising under the patent laws of other countries.
While in Beckman Instruments Judge Tone assumed that
there was subject matter jurisdiction available over the foreign
patent claims,7 there is a possibility that a court could deny
that it had jurisdiction.'
Theoretically, a federal court that has diversity of citizen-
ship jurisdiction, as in Beckman Instruments, would have the
3. Note, Jurisdiction-Foreign Patents-Jurisdiction Over Foreign Patent
Claims, 66 MicH. L. REV. 358 n.1 (1967).
4. Aluminum Co. of America v. Sperry Products, Inc., 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'r &
Foundry Co., 235 F.2d 224 (3rd Cir. 1956), aff'd, 351 U.S. 445 (1956); Dr. Beck & Co.
v. General Electric Co., 210 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afl'd, 317 F.2d 538 (2d Cir.
1963).
5. Dr. Beck & Co. v. General Electric Co., 210 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd,
317 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1963); Sperry Products, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171
F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961).
6. "To promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the
states in patent and copyright cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970). See General Electric
Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932); French Renovating Co. v. Ray
Renovating Co., 170 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1948); Laning v. National Ribbon & Carbon
Paper Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1942).
7. Supra note 1, at 408.
8. Supra note 3, at 371.
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power to bind parties before it, regardless of the nature of the
claims.' However, courts are hesitant to rely solely upon this
reasoning. In the past, courts have been reluctant to determine
foreign patent rights even though they had jurisdiction over the
parties. Most of these cases have failed to directly address the
question and contain language which can be interpreted both
for and against taking jurisdiction.
On their facts, these decisions cannot be read as establish-
ing a broad policy of abstention with regard to foreign patent
claims. They are limited in that the courts had other patent
claims upon which they could rely to make a decision. For
example, in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rubber Tire Wheel
Co.,' 0 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from bringing
suit in Cuba for patent infringement. The Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that the subject
of the Cuban action was in fact a separate Cuban patent and
denied the injunction. A determination of the validity of the
foreign patent was unnecessary to resolve the issue raised by
the complaint. In addition, there was no reason for the Ameri-
can court to decide the question of Cuban law, since the action
was also before a Cuban court-a better place to decide the
issue.
Past decisions involving foreign patents or trademarks also
do not consider the possibility of all the parties being U.S.
citizens, whom the court would have the power to bind. In
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., I the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit adopted a rule of nonintervention with
respect to foreign trademarks and refused to permit exercise of
jurisdiction in a case which involved an allegedly invalid and
infringing Canadian trademark. Fearing a conflict with the
Canadian courts, and envisioning difficulties in enforcing any
judgment it might render, the court invoked the doctrine of
forum non conveniens and dismissed the action." The facts in
Vanity Fair are sufficiently similar to permit an analogy to the
Goodyear Tire case. In both cases, the court noted the fact that
9. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 209-11 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
EHRENZWEIGJ; cf. Fall v. Estin, 215 U.S. 1, 15 (1909) (Holmes, J. concurring).
10. 164 F. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1908).
11. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956), rehearing
denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956).
12. 234 F.2d 633, at 645 (1956).
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one or both of the parties in the foreign court would not be the
same as the parties in the United States court. 3 This can be
distinguished from the case where the parties would be the
same in both U.S. and foreign courts, when a court with juris-
diction over both parties should make a controlling decision.
Two other trademark cases, Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele 4
and Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co.,'
have reached the opposite conclusion and permitted issuance
of injunctions which affected foreign trademarks. In both cases,
plaintiffs registered their trademarks under American law.
Defendants subsequently registered the same marks under
Mexican law and imported their products into the United
States. The courts enjoined the use of both trademarks by de-
fendants in the United States. While the opinions stated that
the courts did not intend to invalidate the foreign trademarks,
the injunctions may have had much the same impact. 6
All parties concerned in Steele and in Las Palmas Food
were citizens of the United States and therefore subject to its
jurisdiction. It may be concluded that the cases involved acts
which had a significant effect on United States commerce. If a
case would have an effect on commerce within the United
States it can be argued that a court would have jurisdiction.
The latter of these two points may be vital. In United States
v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 7 the citizenship factor
was overshadowed by the importance of a substantial Ameri-
can policy. The Imperial Chemical case involved a suit by the
federal government alleging a violation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). The Court required Imperial Chemi-
cal Industries, a British corporation, to grant licenses to certain
American patents and to refrain from bringing suit for infringe-
ment under the British patents. The American court thus pur-
ported to limit a foreign corporation's otherwise valid foreign
patents by qualifying their use within the territory of the grant-
ing sovereign. The court did this despite the fact that it was
against British public policy and that a British court would not
13. Id. at 647 n.20.
14. 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1952), aft'd, 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
15. 146 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958).
16. Supra note 3, at 362.
17. 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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enforce such a provision. The court justified its "regulation of
the exercise of rights granted by a foreign government" by rea-
soning that "it is not an intrusion on the authority of a foreign
sovereign for this court to direct that steps be taken to remove
harmful effects on the trade of the United States."' 8
The foregoing cases illustrate that American courts, hav-
ing personal jurisdiction over the parties, will interfere when
such an interference is necessary to enforce a significant United
States policy."
The reluctance of American courts to determine foreign
patent rights even when they have jurisdiction over the parties
stems from the nature of the patent right. A patent right is a
property right and an infringement of that right constitutes a
tort. 0 Once the defendant alleges invalidity of plaintiff's for-
eign patent, the action assumes the appearance of an in rem
proceeding. This is because the court is asked to rule on the
validity of a grant of title by a foreign sovereign. This presents
the problems of an invasion of the traditional notions of sover-
eignty and a foreign jurisdiction's not honoring the decision.2
A foreign jurisdiction could refuse to recognize the judgment
invalidating the patent and uphold the patent in a subsequent
suit for infringement and royalties brought by the patentee.
There are other reasons that have led courts to hold that
they should abstain from deciding on the validity of a foreign
patent. Such claims often force the court to confront a very
technical area of a foreign legal system. Some conclude, as did
Judge Tone,22 that a foreign tribunal would be more qualified
to decide the question. 3 Furthermore, the underlying policy of
the law to be enforced and its remedies may be so inextricably
tied to the economic and social systems of the granting nation
18. Id. at 228-29. Contra, a British court held against I.C.I. when it tried to follow
the U.S. court's directions. British Nylon Spinners v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
[19531 1 Ch. 19 (C.A.).
19. Supra notes 3, 15 and 17; see generally United Cigarette Machine Co. v.
Wright, 156 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1907); cf. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 9, at 74-76.
20. Supra note 3, at 363.
21. See Sandusky Foundry & Machinery Co. v. De Lavand, 251 F. 631 (N.D. Ohio
1918).
22. Supra note 1, at 411.
23. Supra note 3, at 364.
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that it is alien to the American system."4 In Ortman v. Stan-
ray Corp. ,25 Judge Fairchild, in his concurring opinion, stated
several more reasons why a court cannot or should not assume
jurisdiction.
First the court may feel that the claim is based on penal or
revenue laws, or that it involves some other form of foreign gov-
ernmental interest. Secondly, the local jurisdictional machinery
may not be suitable to enforcement of the foreign based claim.
Thirdly, the action may be contrary to the public policy of the
forum. Fourthly, the forum state may be precluded from passing
on an 'act of state.' And lastly the court may decline to exercise
jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens.11
The problems that arise in regard to adjudication of for-
eign patents may be compared to those that develop when
dealing with title to foreign land. 7 A doctrine has developed
that assures that only local courts will decide title to land
within their jurisdiction. The local action rule requires that
certain actions concerning real estate be brought in the
jurisdiction wherein the land lies." Since a patent is akin to
property, some commentators have concluded that an infringe-
ment action or a validity question should be decided where the
patent was registered." In the Ortman case, Judge Fairchild
recognized the possibility of characterizing a foreign patent
claim as a local action but failed to fully examine the feasibil-
ity." The judge further added to the confusion when he stated,
"[t]heoretically it is possible for a state to regard almost any
sort of extrastate cause of action as local, but the current trend
24. Id.
25. 371 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1967).
26. Id. at 159; see also Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
Claims, 46 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1932); H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
20-21 (4th ed. Scoles 1964); Paulsen & Sovem, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws,
56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The "act
of state doctrine" prevents the court of one country from sitting in judgment on the
act of another government done within its own territory; see Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 367 U.S. 398 (1964). The doctrine does not apply to acts predominantly
probate in nature, but acts where the state itself has an interest, e.g., expropriation.
See generally Symposium-Expropriation: Regional Conference, American Society of
International Law (University of Denver College of Law, April 15, 1972), 2 DENVER J.
INT'L. L. & POL. 125 (1972).
27. Supra note 3, at 364.
28. Id. at 372.
29. Id. at 365.
30. Supra note 25, at 160.
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is toward readier enforcement of claims arising under foreign
laws.'' 3'
While a-patent is considered a property right it has been
thought of as intangible property.32 Torts other than those in-
volving real property have always been classified as transitory.
The passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(1964), has resolved this
question by stating that, "Any civil action for patent infringe-
ment may be brought in the judicial district where the
defendant resides . . . ." (emphasis added) In other words,
Congress has statutorily determined that a patent infringe-
ment suit should be considered transitory.
The majority in Ortman felt that they need not decide the
issue of whether the action was local or transitory as they relied
upon the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.3 3 The doctrine of
ancillary, or pendent, jurisdiction allows federal courts to en-
tertain a claim not otherwise within their jurisdiction when
that claim is so closely connected with another claim having a
federal jurisdictional base that it forms one constitutional
case.34 Having originally developed as a result of an effort by
the federal courts to deal with procedural problems created by
parallel state and federal litigation in the property field, the
scope of ancillary jurisdiction was expanded to permit the ad-
judication of non-federal claims when the court believed justice
would be furthered by a single disposition of the case. 35 For the
most part, ancillary jurisdiction has been utilized to adjudicate
related claims based on state law. The court in Ortman cited
no precedent for its position that the doctrine could also apply
to foreign law. While it appeared to have difficulty with the
language of the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 31 the extension is not wholly novel. There have been a
few cases that indicate that the nature of the claim is
31. Id. at 159.
32. H. TOULMAN, JR., HANDBOOK OF PATENTS § 64, at 47 (1954).
33. Supra note 3, at 367. This principle has been defined as follows: "By this
concept it has been held that a district court acquires jurisdiction of a case or contro-
versy as an entirety, and may, as an incident to disposition of a matter properly raised
before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case of which it
could not take cognizance were they independently presented." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 17 (1963).
34. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
35. Supra note 3, at 368 n.56.
36. Supra note 34.
1976
198 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
irrelevant." The fact that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1964) grants
ancillary jurisdiction in patent cases only where there is a re-
lated state claim of unfair business practices should not be held
as a limiting factor. The legislative background of the statute
would seem to indicate that the rule of Hurn v. Oustler should
be codified to extend jurisdiction. 31
The court's reliance on the "reasoning . . . in Gibbs" to
support its conclusion that ancillary jurisdiction is proper re-
gardless of the source of the law appears sound. 39 This exten-
sion is based mainly upon convenience to the parties. 0 But,
37. The vast majority of cases utilize the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to adju-
dicate claims based on state law, but there have been some exceptions which show the
nature of the ancillary claim to be unimportant. See, e.g., Kane v. Central American
Mining & Oil, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), held that related claims based
on the Panamanian corporate law can be pendent to claims based on the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934; Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expanding Concept in
Federal Court Jurisdiction, 51 IOwA L. REV. 151, 157 (1965).
38. Hum v. Oustler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Barron, The Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D. 439,
442 (1949), states that:
Subsection (b) of Section 1338 is new. It is added to give district courts
original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim for unfair compe-
tition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the patent,
copyright or trademark laws. The Supreme Court in Hum v. Oustler,
[citation omitted] held that such a claim of unfair competition of which
a federal court has no original jurisdiction is nevertheless within its ancil-
lary jurisdiction when it arises from the same acts which give rise to the
claim of copyright infringement.
The statutory confirmation of the jurisdiction of federal courts in
cases like these should not be regarded either as an extension or limita-
tion of ancillary jurisdiction in other cases or circumstances.
See Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 232 F. Supp. 814, 821-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
in which the court in a patent case utilized ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate a
compulsory counterclaim although 1338(b) was clearly inapplicable to the particular
claim. See also Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expanding Concept in Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 51 IOWA L. REv. 151 (1965).
39. Supra note 3, at 369; see also Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine
of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1962).
40. Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 163 U.S.P.Q. 331, 333-34 (D.C. N.Ill. 1969).
There are two possible sources of jurisdiction which would allow a federal
district court which has in personam jurisdiction over a defendant to hear
a suit for infringement of a foreign patent by such defendant in the
foreign country which has issued the patent: (1) jurisdiction ancillary to
that entitling a federal court to adjudge United States patents and (2)
general diversity jurisdiction.
The court concluded it should hear the matter
since considerations of convenience to the parties herein which would be
served by litigating these issues in one forum outweigh the difficulties




this justification must be carefully balanced with the protec-
tion of sovereignty, the reluctance to enter unenforceable judg-
ments, and the hesitancy to expend judicial time to investigate
the peculiarities of the body of law and procedure of another
jurisdiction.4' With careful balancing the better rule of law still
would permit an American court to take jurisdiction over a
foreign patent claim.
III. CONFLICTS OF LAW
Assuming that the court in Beckman Instruments had de-
cided it had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the foreign
patents, there would still remain the question of which law or
laws the American court should then apply. Should the court
follow United States patent law,42 the law of the place where
the patent was registered, or the law of the situs of the infringe-
ment?
For determining the validity of a patent, the generally
applied rule is the law of the country where the patent was
granted and/or is registered-the so-called "country of protec-
tion. ' 4 3 There is some authority that no conflict of law can arise
in connection with a patent's validity as there is but one law,
that of the registering country.44 This principle does not, how-
ever, operate in a vacuum. It must be tempered by another
strong conflicts policy which will not allow use of a foreign law
that is contrary to public policy. 5 American courts have consis-
tently denied enforcement of foreign law where it was contrary
to public policy." The public policy, however, must be suffi-
41. Supra note 3, at 368.
42. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970).
43. Meinhardt, Conflict Avoidance in the Law of Patents and Trademarks, 21 L.
& CONTEMP. PROB. 533, at 533 n.2 (1956).
It is significant that no leading treatises on American, British, Canadian,
French, German, or Swiss patent and trademark law devotes a chapter
to the conflict of laws, or even mentions the subject in its index. Con-
versely, with possibly one exception, see CLIVE M. SCHNrrTHOFF, THE ENG-
LISH CONFLICT OF LAWS 13, 14, 205, 212, 418 (3d ed. 1954), the leading
treatises on the conflict of laws deal only briefly, if at all, with patents
and trademarks. E.g. Rabel confines his treatment of the subject to a few
lines quoting a small number of cases to the effect that a patent or
trademark can be infringed only in the country of protection. See 2 ERNST
RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 295 (1950).
44. Id. at 534.
45. Id. at 538; see RESTATEMENT SECOND, CONFLICT OF LAW § 332(b) (Tent. draft
No. 6 1960); RESTATEMENT SECOND, CONFLICT OF LAW § 90 (1969).
46. Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflicts of Law, 56 COLUM. L. REV.
969, 992-93 (1956).
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ciently strong that the court can justify its refusal to apply
foreign law.47
Admittedly, the provisions of foreign patent laws dealing
with infringement differ from country to country. An American
court faced with using several foreign statutes could find itself
hopelessly lost. Yet, for all the diversity of infringement laws,
the validity sections of many foreign patent laws are remarka-
bly similar. The major tests for patentability in the United
States are novelty, usefulness, and non-obviousness.48 For most
countries the test is quite similar, if not identical.4" A United
47. RESTATEMENT SECOND, CONFLICT OF LAW § 90, comment c (1969).
48. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1970).
49. DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD-PATENTS & TRADEMARKS (G.
Kohlic ed. 1975). The key provisions of the foreign patent laws involved here are:
Canada: Patent Act of 1935 and Patent Rules of 1948. Subject matter and
patentability-An invention must be a "new manner of manufacture"
and meet the standards of novelty.
France: Patent Act of January 2, 1968. This law has been in force since
January 1, 1969. However, several provisions of the former law of July 5,
1844 remain applicable to patents filed prior to January 1, 1969. Subject
matter and patentability-It must be novel. It must satisfy an industrial
purpose (useful in industry). It must not be obvious.
Federal Republic of Germany: Law governing patents-Patent Act (Pa-
tentgesetz) of January 2, 1968. Subject matter-Patents are granted in
respect of new inventions which are susceptible to industrial use.
Israel: Law governing patents-The Law of Patents, in force April 1, 1968
(prior law is similar to British). Subject matter-The Law defines an
invention proper for the grant of a patent as a product or process that is
new, useful, fit for use in industry or agriculture, and reveals an inventive
advance.
Italy: Law governing patents-Royal Decree No. 3731 of October 30, 1859,
concerning industrial patents. Also in force: Law No. 1178 of December
24, 1959, effective February 1, 1960; Royal Decree No. 1127 of June 29,
1939; and Decree No. 849 of February 26, 1968. Subject matter-An es-
sential condition to grant a patent is the "industriality" (industrial use-
fulness) of the invention. The object of the patent can be any new inven-
tion which can have a concrete industrial application with industrial
results of a scientific principle, a method of manufacturing.
Sweden: Law governing patents-Patent Act, December 1, 1967. In force
from January 1, 1968. Royal Decree on Patents (Formalities) of December
1, 1967. In force from January 1, 1968. Subject matter-Patents can be
granted only for an invention that is considerably different from what was
known before the dete of application.
Switzerland: Law governing patents-Federal Act Concerning Patents of
June 25, 1954 (Patent Act); Regulations I of December 14, 1958, as
amended; Regulations II of September 8, 1959, as amended; Federal Act
concerning the priority rights with patents and industrial designs of April
3, 1914, as amended in 1959. Subject matter-An invention has to be new
and commercially applicable. It has to provide a substantial technical
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States court faced with finding the fact of novelty, usefulness,
and non-obviousness of an American patent could as easily
apply those same findings of fact to the foreign law.
A very real possibility does exist that a foreign court will
refuse to accept a judgment by a United States court.5" This
problem can be avoided if both parties are still under the juris-
diction of the American court. Such jurisdiction can be either
in personam or, if there is property of the parties within the
court's jurisdiction, in rem. Upon a finding of invalidity of a
foreign patent a court could enforce its decision through either
a mandatory injunction ordering the foreign patentee to grant
a license or the threat of a contempt citation if suit is brought
in another jurisdiction.
Some courts, however, have been wary of the use of injunc-
tions and have refused to issue such orders. In Canadian Filters
v. Lear-Siegler,5 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the principle of comity prevents a district court from en-
joining a patent holder's Canadian action for infringement of
a Canadian patent." This is a strong statement that could have
far reaching effects that the court did not realize. The court did
temper this language when it stated,
[d]oubtless there are times when comity, a blend of courtesy
and expedience, must give way, for example when the forum
seeks to enforce its own substantial interests, or in limited cir-
cumstances when relitigation would cover exactly the same
point .... 11
In any event this approach is far too broad in scope in that it
prevents the court from enjoining any relitigations before for-
progress including some inventive level. Its inventive substance should
not be unknown or obvious to the expert.
United Kingdom: Law governing patents-Patent Acts of 1949 and 1957;
the Patent Rules 1958 and 1959/1964; and the Rules of the Supreme Court
(Order 103). Subject matter-A patent will be refused if the invention as
disclosed in the United Kingdom or in the Convention Country (Interna-
tional Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property), as the case
may be, is not new, having regard to what was known or used before the
priority date of the claim. The invention must be non-obvious.
50. Compare United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 105 F. Supp. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) with British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
[1953] 1 Ch. 19 (C.A.).
51. 412 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1969).
52. Id. at 579.
53. Id. at 578-79.
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eign courts, including those cases which, under settled law,
clearly would be enjoined, such as a contract action where a
U.S. court has determined the validity of disputed clauses.
Canadian Filters goes far beyond the principle that the injunc-
tive relief should be used sparingly and only when necessary to
prevent inequities. The problem of enforcing conflicting judg-
ments makes it important that the power to enjoin relitigation
in foreign courts be preserved and exercised where equity
demands.54 Given the possible pit-falls of accepting jurisdiction
over foreign patents a court can competently determine valid-
ity if it is aware of the problem areas.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The court in Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., held that it should abstain from exercising juris-
diction over claims for infringement of foreign patents where
the validity of those patents would be put in issue. The reason-
ing behind this decision was that a determination of invalidity
would involve a form of governmental interest which a U.S.
court would not be the correct forum to enforce, the court
would be required to deal with foreign laws and language, and
effective relief could be given by enforcement of the United
States patent. The better rule of law would have been for the
court to accept jurisdiction.
The court felt that by withholding relief it was furthering
a recognized public policy. To the contrary, it was impinging
upon two fundamental federal policies. There is a strong fed-
eral policy favoring free competition in ideas that do not merit
patent protection.5 By not availing itself of the opportunity to
determine the validity issue, the court thus prevented a citizen
from enjoying a free flow of ideas-clearly not in furtherance
of public policy. Likewise, by not taking jurisdiction the court
was sanctioning acts which would have an adverse effect on
United States commerce, another violation of public policy.
The court expressed a fear that taking jurisdiction would
54. Note, Federal Courts-Injunctions-The Principle of Comity Prevents Fed-
eral Court from Enjoining Canadian Patent Holder's Infringement Action in Canadian
Court. Canadian Filters v. Lear-Siegler, 412 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1969), 6 TEXAS INT'L L.
FORUM 143 (1970).
55. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp.
v. Day Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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raise serious questions of comity." Declaring an act of a foreign
governmental agency invalid is a serious action. However,
there is a strong possibility that if the case were before a foreign
court with the validity of an American patent in question, the
foreign court would assume jurisdiction over the American
patent.57 The similarities between patent laws permit a reason-
able understanding regardless of the social and economic poli-
cies behind the foreign patent laws. If foreign courts feel com-
petent to determine the validity of American patent law, then
comity would certainly permit the converse. The court would
also be seeking to enforce its own substantial interests and
further litigation would cover the same points.
In addition, enforcement of the judgment in Beckman
Instruments would not have been as difficult as the court pre-
sumed. Both parties were domiciled in the United States and
had property within reach of the court. An injunction prohibit-
ing suit in a foreign country may not in itself have prevented a
foreign suit, but balanced against a contempt citation the
probability of a suit was small. Similarly, an order for a license,
backed by contempt power, would have resolved the problem.
An exercise of jurisdiction would have prevented the possi-
bility of additional vexatious and harassing litigation against
Beckman Instruments, Inc. In the past, other courts have ac-
cepted jurisdiction and enjoined parties from further actions.5 8
A determination of only the American patent left Beckman
Instruments open to further suits in foreign jurisdictions. Had
the court considered the full ramifications of its actions it
would likely not have denied jurisdiction.
Finally, the court felt that a decision on the United States
patent would resolve any conflict. What the court failed to
56. Supra note 1, at 410.
57. Stauder, Patent Infringement in Export Trade-The Vulnerable Combination
Patent, 3 11C n.51 (1972):
This is why today the German authors hold the view, contrary to earlier
decisions of the Reichsgericht, that German courts have jurisdiction to
decide actions based on infringement of foreign patents whenever the
German Code of Civil Procedure provides for a proper forum. See Raimer
& Nastelski, PATENTGESETZ UND GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESErZ, at n.3 to Sec.
6 PatG; Hesse in Klauer & Mahring, PATENTRECHSKOMMENTAR, at n.175
to Sec. 6 PatG (Munich, 3d ed. 1971), with references.
58. See Harvey Aluminum v. American Cyanimid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.
1953).
1976
204 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 6:191
consider was the possibility of further suits in foreign jurisdic-
tions. If the court found the U.S. patent invalid, free competi-
tion would have been available in the United States, but the
ability to export to foreign countries would have been severely
curtailed due to a fear of future infringement suits in importing
countries. By accepting jurisdiction, the court would have re-
duced needless litigation in other jurisdictions.
It is granted that if the court had taken jurisdiction it
would have had to deal with the difficulties of foreign laws. But
balanced against public policy considerations, comity with
other nations, prevention of vexatious and harassing suits, and
avoidance of excessive litigation, the better decision would
have been to accept jurisdiction.
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